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Editorial
A Paraconsistent Decagon
A scientific meeting is a success when it promotes a blend of ideas, proposals, guidelines
and criticisms that will influence further research in the area. Measured by such standards,
the Workshop on Paraconsistent Logic (WoPaLo),1 was a very successful meeting. The
present volume intends to attest this, bringing a finely revised collection of articles, a se-
quel of a previous electronic publication containing all the extended abstracts available
under the title “Proceedings of the Workshop on Paraconsistent Logic (WoPaLo)” at CLE
e-Prints Vol. 2(7), 2002.2
Paraconsistency, in very simple terms, is the logical study of inconsistent yet non-trivial
theories or premise sets. It is a sign of maturity of contemporary logic that logicians were
liberated from the horror contradictionis and started to build theories in which contradic-
tories may not only subsist but in fact be the object of mathematical study. In brief terms,
paraconsistency is neither the sport of collecting contradictions or passion of cultivating
them, nor the craft of building eccentric logics, but rather the delicate art of carving logical
systems with less material than in the abundance and security of classical territory, where
contradictions are banned and one has at her disposal a surplus of building material.
Without any intention of historical completeness, but just to mark an area of research,
it may be appropriate to recall here the names of the Polish logician Stanisław Jas´kowski
and the Brazilian logician Newton C.A. da Costa, who independently urged for the devel-
opment of logical systems in which the classical principle that demands anything to follow
from a contradiction would be logically controlled. Much of the impetus of the research on
paraconsistent logics is motivated by the attainment of those goals: Taming the explosive
power of contradictions, and yet being able to deliver logics sharing with the classical par-
adigm many desirable features, as model existence results and model theory, reasonable
proof methods, algebraic and set-theoretic counterparts, (un)decidability and so on. More-
1 Held in Trento, Italy, from 5 to 9 August 2002, as part of the XIV European Summer School in
Logic, Language and Information (ESSLLI 2002), organized under the auspices of the European Associ-
ation for Logic, Language and Information (FoLLI). For more information, check the WoPalo homepage:
http://logica.ugent.be/WoPaLo.
2 Check http://www.cle.unicamp.br/e-prints/abstract_16.html.1570-8683/$ – see front matter  2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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have to be demonstrated in justification of the particular approach.
The significance of paraconsistency from the purely logical point of view is founded in
the meticulous dissociation between the general notions of contradictoriness and of trivi-
ality of a theory. So, on the one hand, if explosiveness due to contradictions is controlled,
there is room for logics that allow for contradictory but non-trivial theories (even if these
are considered as temporary, or as restricted to certain circumstances). On the other hand,
the challenge is to construct logics keeping with such dissociation.
One can identify at least three main definitions of paraconsistent logic in the already
vast literature if the area. Jas´kowski’s definition proposes the investigation of logics that
could serve as bases for non-explosive theories (i.e. theories which would not collapse
into overcompleteness in the presence of contradictions). Da Costa’s definition calls for
the investigation of logics that could support contradictory theories while at the same
time preventing some of those theories from being trivial. A third definition considers that
consistent logics are those which are both explosive and non-trivial, and calls for the inves-
tigation of paraconsistent logics exactly as those which are inconsistent yet still non-trivial.
The equivalence of the three definitions can be shown under appropriate qualifications
about the properties of the underlying inference relations of the considered logics.
It comes as no surprise that a mathematically well-founded theory that diminishes the
gulf between pragmatical reasoning and symbolic reasoning, with its effects on argumen-
tation, on thinking and even on constructing mathematical proofs (one cannot so candidly
blame contradictions for mathematical existence or non-existence any more) forces a reex-
amination of the classical account of rationality. Induction, deduction and abduction cannot
ignore this new frontier. The science of information, with its twilight zone of incongruity
and vagueness, claims for the investigation of methods helping to tolerate and even to take
profit of contradictions, be they de dicto or de facto. The possibility of paraconsistent rea-
soning has thus matched the interest of philosophers, linguists and computer scientists.
Interesting dialectical and relevance logics are paraconsistent, and some concepts in the
philosophy of science can be recast in the light of paraconsistency. Some kinds of linear
and quantum logics can be shown to benefit from the paraconsistent viewpoint. The same
holds for software engineering, database theory, model checking, theorem proving, logic
programming, data mining, evolutionary computation, semantic web and model-based rea-
soning, fields that are quickly improving their standards to work under logics that loose
little from the classical point of view, and yet permit to learn from contradictions.
On what this collection is made of
The collection of papers in the present collection makes justice to the description of
paraconsistency we have sketched above. We include a brief invitation to each paper, with
the sole intention of offering an appetizing preview of what is coming. Of course, the
invitation will never make justice to reading the full papers: We can only hope the reader
will accept it.
“Paraconsistent logic from a modal viewpoint”, by Jean-Yves Béziau, offers a modal
perspective on paraconsistent negation. By introducing a new approach based on the well-
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new look of the (modal) square of oppositions, pointing out that one of the corners of the
square has no denotation in natural language, and arguing that this nameless corner has to
do with paraconsistent negation.
In “Models for a paraconsistent set theory”, Thierry Libert searches for natural mod-
els for paraconsistent extensions of positive set theory. In order to circumvent traditional
difficulties such as Russell’s paradox, paraconsistent sets are actualized by considering
membership and non-membership as somewhat independent properties. In reviewing pre-
vious related approaches, some emphasis is put on the use of fixed-point arguments and
the distinction abstraction/comprehension in the formalization of set theory. The existence
of natural topological models for comprehension is then established.
Sergei P. Odintsov, in “On the structure of paraconsistent extensions of Johansson’s
logic”, gives a compact presentation of basic results on the class Jhn of non-trivial para-
consistent yet partially explosive extensions of minimal (or Johansson’s) logic. The author
argues that, unlike the class of intermediate logics, the class Jhn has an interesting and
non-trivial global structure. The study of this class is based on an adequate presentation of
algebraic and Kripke-style semantics for extensions of minimal logic.
In “An encompassing framework for paraconsistent logic programs”, João Alcântara,
Carlos Viegas Damásio and Luís Moniz Pereira propose a framework that extends anti-
tonic logic programs and illustrate the use of bilattices in logic programming for reasoning
with uncertain, incomplete and inconsistent information, in a way that immediately ap-
peals to those who are familiar with the work of M. Fitting and with probabilistic deductive
databases. As motivation, several interesting examples of the large range of applications of
the authors’ techniques are contemplated. The framework provided is argued to be strong
enough as to allow for the embedding of other logic programming systems.
“Paraconsistent informational logic”, by Paola Forcheri and Paolo Gentilini stresses an
application of paraconsistent logics to formal epistemology. The authors present a formal-
ism to express conjectures as formal objects, where the deductive apparatus of conjecturing
agents is conflated with some given environment system. In such an interaction of agents
with environment, inconsistencies might quite reasonably emerge. According to a logical
entropy measure they introduce, a theory which contradicts another one can still constitute
a very good conjecture with respect to the latter, and this clearly extends the notion of ra-
tionality of an agent holding such a theory. The formalism is then applied for a particular
logic of formal inconsistency, and a proof-theoretical investigation follows.
In “Aristotle’s Thesis between paraconsistency and modalization” Claudio Pizzi re-
visits some paraconsistent extensions of relevant logics in relation to Aristotle’s thesis
¬(A → ¬A) and the Law of Simplification (A ∧ B) → B . The paper aims to show that
interpretations of Aristotle’s Thesis may vary according to different understandings of the
arrow →, while the role of paraconsistency is discussed therein. It is proved that under
a certain definition of the arrow, Aristotle’s Thesis subjoined to the minimal normal sys-
tem K yields a system equivalent to the deontic system KD, and this modalization allows
interpreting the arrow as the expression of relevance in a specific modal sense.
In “Combining classical logic, paraconsistency and relevance”, Arnon Avron explores
relevance concerns inside paraconsistent domains and presents a logic having a simple
semantics and a cut-free Gentzen-type proof system. This logic combines classical logic
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interesting properties, the author defends the qualities of the underlying language of his
logic from the semantical viewpoint.
In “Anti-intuitionism and paraconsistency” Andreas Brunner and Walter A. Carnielli
carefully discuss and investigate the question of the duality between intuitionistic and
paraconsistent thought paradigms. They argue that the quest for duality requires a multiple-
conclusion logical environment where refutative systems must be considered, as well as
the usual demonstrative systems. By proposing new hierarchies of anti-intuitionistic logics
(that include formulations of a dual-Johánsson’s logic and of Gödel’s three-valued logic)
and studying their relations with intuitionistic logics, they show that all anti-intuitionistic
logics are paraconsistent, but those particular duals give rise to brand new paraconsistent
logics. On the other hand, duals of paracomplete (or maximal weakly intuitionistic) many-
valued logics do coincide with well-known many-valued paraconsistent logics.
In “On negation: pure local rules” João Marcos carries out a systematic study of the
properties of negation from the point of view of abstract deductive systems. By means of a
unifying framework of multiple-conclusion consequence relations, several rules for nega-
tion, among them the generalized forms of proof by cases, of consequentia mirabilis and of
reductio ad absurdum are expressed. Moreover, dualization reveals many rules heretofore
unspoken of. This framework also permits careful definitions of varieties of paraconsis-
tency and of the dual paracompleteness, allowing for pseudo-scotus and ex contradictione
to be distinguished and for a comprehensive version of the Principle of Non-Triviality to
be expressed. The author also inaugurates the study of logics and of logical constants from
a negative perspective, and supports the claim that negative rules are in a sense more fun-
damental than positive rules. A survey of the related literature on negation is advanced, and
many corrections or updates are made on proposals and results by other authors.
In “A procedural criterion for final derivability in inconsistency-adaptive logics”,
Diderik Batens investigates a goal-directed proof procedure for the inconsistency-adap-
tive logic ACLuN1. Adaptive logics characterize inference relations that lack a positive
test, which occur in ordinary reasoning and scientific reasoning processes. The proofs of
adaptive logics are necessarily dynamic, whence it is important to decide whether a for-
mula derived at a stage is ‘finally derived’. The proposed procedure defines an algorithm
for final derivability at the propositional level that can be extended to the predicative level,
providing a criterion for final derivability there. The procedure is generalizable to all flat
adaptive logics.
We believe that the ten fully refereed and well-worked papers published here provide
a nice and informative portrait, quite representative of the strength and of the variety in
the field of paraconsistent logics. In composing this collection we received help from an
impressive number of instances and people to whom we wish to express our thanks: To the
Organizing Committee of the ESSLLI 2002 for all the help and partial financial support
provided to the WoPaLo and its organizers, to Dov Gabbay for his invitation to publish this
material in the Journal of Applied Logic, to Mrs. Jane Spurr for her assistance in materi-
alizing this possibility, and specially to the inestimable help of a(n otherwise anonymous)
team of referees who assisted us in selecting the submissions, improving and correcting
mistakes, adding references, and decisively contributed to the quality of this volume. We
name them here as a sign of our gratitude: Martin Allen, Ofer Arieli, Peter Arnd, Arnon
J. Marcos et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 1–5 5Avron, Diderik Batens, Valentin Bazhanov, Salem Benferhat, Leopoldo Bertossi, Philippe
Besnard, Ross Brady, Bryson Brown, Carlos Caleiro, Walter Carnielli, Marcelo Coniglio,
Carlos Viegas Damásio, Sandra de Amo, Marcelo Finger, Melvin Fitting, Melvin Ran-
dall Holmes, Lloyd Humberstone, Larisa Maksimova, Jacek Malinowski, João Marcos,
Storrs McCall, David W. Miller, Chris Mortensen, Marek Nasieniewski, Sergei Odintsov,
Nicola Olivetti, Hiroakira Ono, Francesco Paoli, Graham Priest, Stephen Read, Greg Re-
stall, Frank T. Sautter, Luis A. Sbardellini, Peter K. Schotch, Ralf Schweimeier, Paul
Taylor, Max Urchs, Guido Vanackere, Heinrich Wansing, Timothy Williamson, Andrzej
Wisniewski and Marek Zawadowski.
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